There is a well-worn image and phrase for libertarianism: "atomized individualism." This hobgoblin has spread so thoroughly that even some libertarians think their philosophy unreservedly supports private persons, whatever the situation, whatever their behavior. Smith's Self-Interest and Social Order in Classical Liberalism, corrects this misrepresentation with careful intellectual surveys of Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Butler, Mandeville, and Hutcheson and their respective contributions to political philosophy.

Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states (...) as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology — that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states — brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another. (shrink)

This essay argues for internalism in maintaining that there is a sense of “determination” – namely “a selection of one” – according to which phenomenological content determines the object of an experience. The subject may not be able to describe the object in a way which distinguishes it from all other objects, but the object is nevertheless determined by the unity of sense, or noema, which presents it.

My dissertation presents the outlines of a theory about knowledge and virtue. The core idea is that the nature of knowledge is best understood by reflecting on its role in intellectual practice. What distinguishes knowledge from true opinion is not primarily its causal history or its internal structure, as standard theories argue, but rather the way in which knowledge is embedded or rooted in our styles of explanation, modes of communication and methods of teaching. Knowledge becomes rooted in our practices (...) through the cultivation and exercise of intellectual virtue, or the dispositions and skills needed to master varieties of theoretical and practical reasoning. The link to virtuous intellectual activity is what makes knowledge more valuable than true opinion. This suggests that the virtues of intellectual practice are central to our understanding of the nature of knowledge. I devote the first half of the dissertation to showing why we need a theory of virtue in epistemology and how in general that theory ought to be formulated. In the second half, I address skeptical objections and other problems that arise during my formulation of the theory. ;The starting point is a puzzle from Plato's Meno about the value of knowledge. As Socrates observed, true belief has the same practical value as knowledge. So why should we prefer the one to the other or even distinguish between the two? Most philosophers agree that true belief is not enough for knowledge, but there is little agreement about what it lacks and why the distinction matters. Standard attempts to fill this gap either conceive knowledge as true belief with the right kind of causal history or as responsibly formed belief with the right kind of rational structure. But neither strategy is satisfactory because neither adequately reflects the role that knowledge plays in intellectual practice. This suggests that there is something wrong with the standard belief-theoretic analysis of knowledge. I develop a new account of the nature and value of knowledge that better explains the connection between the norms of virtuous inquiry and the goal of understanding. (shrink)

G. H. Mead left the following heretofore unpublished material in his desk at the University of Chicago, and it was first discovered by Charles W. Morris in the Summer of 1931. Mr. Morris, who was one of Mead's students in the 1920's, had been teaching at Rice University, but was appointed as a full-time staff member in the department of philosophy at Chicago in 1931; he was given the same office that Mead had occupied for many years prior to his (...) death in April of that year. Due to severely strained relations between the then newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, Robert Maynard Hutchins, and the regular staff members in the philosophy department, several of the latter left Chicago and were employed elsewhere in the fall of 1931. Consequently it seemed appropriate that Mr. Morris and some of Mead's other students should deal with the many unpublished typewritten conjectures that Mead left in his office. The entire book, The Philosophy of the Act, is a collection of items found by Mr. Morris, and the following material is from the same source. It came to my hands twenty-seven years ago because I was one of the collaborators in editing The Philosophy of the Act. If there is a slight over-lapping of the following material and subjects discussed in The Philosophy of the Act, it is for the sake of continuity and clarity. I have corrected the material for spelling and punctuation, and I have tried to give it a systematic arrangement. (shrink)

As Ricœur scholars know, the literature by and on Ricœur is vast. Material written by Ricœur that is not collected in published volumes is often difficult to locate, and even in the published volumes it is frequently a challenge to locate where Ricœur discusses a particular topic. Given the amount of his work it can be a challenge too to determine changes in his analyses over the life of his corpus. And locating secondary literature on Ricœur can be equally problematic. (...) In response, we have been working to establish a model for how Ricœur’s corpus might be digitized so that the issues of access, keyword location, and pattern might all be addressed. To develop the model, we are starting with Ricœur’s primary texts in English and plan to expand over time to other languages and to the secondary literature on Ricœur. In the present article we discuss our model and its five steps: digital access; copyright; text preparation for digital searches and analysis; examples of digital searches and analyses; and an archive portal interface that allows users to query based on an extensible set of search variables without needing to know or access the underlying search logic. We also invite interested researchers to help assist the development of this digitization project. (shrink)

Anarchism is a theory of the good society, in which justice and social order are maintained without the State (or government). Many anarchists in the libertarian movement (including myself) were heavily influenced by the epistemological and moral theories of Ayn Rand. According to these anarchists, Rand's principles, if consistently applied, lead necessarily to a repudiation of government on moral grounds.

The form in which the metaphysical quality appears most definitely is in the character of matter that cannot be experienced itself and yet is regarded without question by the scientist as there. There is an illustration of a possible metaphysical inquiry, in a study of the matter and form of electrons. We can set up models of them but we know that no model we set up can have the character that the electrons themselves have; yet these electrons themselves are (...) the conditions for the experience that we do have, and they can be presented to us in terms of that experience of which they are the condition. Such a field of investigation, as to their reality, their nature, would be a metaphysical field. It is a field of reality that cannot be brought inside of experience itself, because it is a condition of that experience, and yet it is a field which the experience itself implies. That would be, I presume, that which would appear in our own thought as the most evident example of a metaphysical discipline. Of course if it is approached from metaphysics as distinct from the physical standpoint, we are not distinguishing what the scientist is particularly interested in. He postulates something that is there, and is able to determine relations of uniformity, logical patterns, as appearing in that field, and he is liable to set up apparatus of the experiential type to occupy the field and to serve as relata. But he is not himself particularly interested in distinguishing what the matter of those relata is in itself. He is interested in relations, in laws of matter, in uniformities, in the mathematical functions that can be made use of for expressing those laws. These logical patterns are what he is seeking and he constructs the models which will enable him to grasp them. The metaphysical investigation would ask what the natures of these forms are that constitute the relata between which these relations obtain. (shrink)

In assimilating the study of history to the study of natural science, Bacon emphasized the collection of historical facts and the need to induce general propositions from them. He indicated the psychological character of these propositions and claimed that historians were, and philosophers were not, competent to put moral and mental phenomena on a scientific basis. On the formal side, his theory of history was based on Aristotelian faculty psychology-history, the product of the mnemonic faculty, dealt with phenomena true to (...) life. In intent, his theory was designed to reorient the study of moral philosophy away from rationalism toward an empirical or historical foundation and to emphasize involuntary as well as voluntary aspects of behavior. (shrink)

Hermeneutics encounters three current challenges: by more quantitative orientations, by stances that reject pluralism, and by criticism that the hermeneutic field is elitist and esoteric. The article offers a response through Ricœur. The hermeneutic “choice in favor of meaning” insists upon the ontological value of the human condition. It shows the insufficiency of the quantitative approach, the remaining value of pluralistic consideration of what human meaning entails, and the real world consequences of interpretation. Examples in Ricœur show how a hermeneutic (...) choice in favor of meaning is not passive but instead reads texts with a particular orientation even when the text seems engaged in another project. The article’s final part undertakes an internal critique, raising the adequacy of Ricœur’s emphasis on meaning as an affirmation of “being.” The example of Buddhist insistence on “emptiness” is offered as one counterexample. The article concludes by arguing that in our contentious times hermeneutics confirms its contemporary vitality through its choice in favor of meaning even as it retains pluralistic consideration of what that meaning entails. (shrink)

This edition of George Berkeley's Philosophical Commentaries, first published in 1989, provides an accurate transcription of Berkeley's manuscript, and introduction to set it in perspective, extensive notes to aid in interpreting it, and a full index to facilitate the use of it.

As Canadian experience back to the Great Depression reveals, monetary policy can have potent impact on social welfare. Although in recent years Canadian monetary policy has been managed—with little public understanding—for the benefit of wealthy interests, earlier Canadian federal governments, largely through the monetary powers of the Bank of Canada established in 1935, not only financed participation in World War II, but also in the post-war period created the nation's remarkable social programs. Changes in monetary policy beginning in the late (...) 1970s have shifted control over the money system almost entirely to the private commercial banks, and have contributed substantially to severe erosion of those programs. Changes in current monetary policy, shown from past experience to be feasible, could play a key role in financing restoration and improvement of social programs. Some implications for the US and other nations are spelled out. (shrink)